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THE PRIVILEGE STOPS AT THE BORDER,
EVEN IF A COMMUNICATION KEEPS GOING
Consequences of the Disparity Between U.S. and E.U. Treatment of
Communications From In-House Attorneys After Akzo-Nobel

David S. Jones*
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a South Carolina attorney provides solicited legal
advice to a corporate client that operates in both South Carolina and the
European Union. The practitioner may assume that the attorney-client
privilege protects that communication. Is the attorney correct?
The answer may well be no, depending on where the question is
asked. If the client employs the attorney as in-house counsel, then a
court of the European Union would likely not honor the privilege.
Indeed, in Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. v. European Commission, the
European Court of Justice mandates this result. 1 Conversely, a South
Carolina court would likely uphold the privilege based on the
evidentiary rules of the forum and the strong public policy in favor of
the attorney-client privilege.2 However, if the right conditions were in
place, a court of this state could reasonably find that the attorney-client
privilege did not attach.
This note seeks to educate South Carolina practitioners on the
state of E.U.-level evidentiary privilege law and the possible
implications for their practices involving clients operating under E.U.
jurisdiction. Part I will discuss the development of E.U. privilege law
through the European Court of Justice decision in Akzo and explore the
weight and scope of that opinion. Part II will analyze the practical
implications of this body of law for South Carolina attorneys in the
context of cross-border communications from in-house attorneys and

* David S. Jones is a J.D. candidate at the University of South Carolina
School of Law, class of 2013. He holds a bachelor of liberal arts in
international studies from the University of South Carolina, class of 2006.
1
Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://eurlex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62007J0550:EN:HTML
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2012).
2
See State v. Love, 275 S.C. 55, 59, 271 S.E.2d 110, 112 (1980).
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predict how a South Carolina court might address a challenge to an
assertion of privilege over such a communication.

I.
A.

CURRENT EUROPEAN-UNION PRIVILEGE LAW: NOT THE
TYPICAL AMERICAN ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
BACKGROUND: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF E.U. STRUCTURAL FACTORS

The European Union (E.U.) is a supra-national organization of
independent European countries.3 The E.U. is a continually evolving
project, and is neither a loose treaty organization nor a centralized
federation.4 The E.U. government is composed of several institutions,
including three major branches: the European Parliament, the European
Commission, and the European Court of Justice. 5 While these three
branches of government are separate, they are not equal in the
American sense. The European Commission is the dominant force in
E.U. government; the Commission exercises legislative, executive, and
judicial powers.6
The International HR Journal has done an excellent job of
describing the judicial relationship between the European Commission
and the European Court of Justice:
The [European] Commission has investigative and
enforcement powers over entities operating within
the E.U. Once the Commission finds a violation, the
entity's recourse is to have the Court of Justice review
the Commission's decision.
The Court of Justice is the judicial branch of the E.U.
It may review the Commission's procedures in
imposing fines on an entity, but it cannot assume the
role of a fact finder. Therefore, the only issues that
an entity that has been fined by the Commission can
3
Basic
Information
on
the
European
Union,
EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2012).
4
See
The
History
of
the
European
Union,
EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
5
EU Institutions and Other Bodies, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abouteu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
6
See European Commission, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abouteu/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm (last visited Mar.
11, 2012).
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bring before the Court of Justice are allegations that
the Commission violated procedure in reaching its
decision to impose the fine. The Court of Justice's
decision is binding on all E.U. members and all
entities operating within them. 7
Another structural difference between the U.S. and the E.U. is the
difference between the legal systems of the member states and the role
of private litigants. With the exception of the United Kingdom,
member states of the E.U. use a version of the civil law system. 8 Civil
law systems do not employ the extensive discovery methods of
common law systems.9 Consequently, litigants in a civil law system
must depend on public disclosures, and do not have the power to
demand access to internal documents as in the U.S. Conversely, many
civil law systems do not recognize any privilege over communications
between in-house attorneys and the employing corporation. 10 This
means that where an entity, such as a governmental agency, does have
the power to demand access to internal documents, those
communications are not protected.
B.

BACKGROUND: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA

Before focusing on evidentiary privilege law in the E.U., it may
be helpful to review the American attorney-client privilege as a point of
reference. The attorney-client privilege attaches to communications
between an attorney and a client where it is “shown that the
relationship between the parties was that of attorney and client and that

7

Publisher’s Editorial Staff, Operation of the Attorney-Client Privilege in
the European Union, 18 No. 3 Int’l HR J.Art. 4 n. 1 (2009).
8
See D. A. O. Edward, THE PROFESSIONAL SECRET, CONFIDENTIALITY
AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN THE NINE MEMBER STATES OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 5-6 (1976), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/
user_upload/NTCdocument/edward_enpdf1_1182334460.pdf; see also Council
of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, THE PROFESSIONAL
SECRET, CONFIDENTIALITY AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN EUROPE 1-2
(2003), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/
update_edwards_repor1_1182333982.pdf (updating the previous report by D.
A. O. Edward).
9
Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, The EU Court’s Decision in Akzo Nobel is
Not a Big, Bad Wolf, S.C. LAWYER, Jan. 2012, at 15, 17-18.
10
Id. at 18.
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the communications were of a confidential nature.” 11 In State v. Love,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina reiterated that,
[t]his privilege is based upon a wise public policy
that considers that the interests of society are best
promoted by inviting the utmost confidence on the
part of the client in disclosing his secrets to his
professional advisor, under the pledge of the law that
such confidence should not be abused by permitting
disclosure of such communications. 12
Corporations in South Carolina almost certainly enjoy the
attorney-client privilege when communicating with their in-house
counsel acting in their legal capacity. In the seminal decision on
attorney-client privilege in the U.S., the Supreme Court, in Upjohn v.
United States, affirmed that the policy underlying the attorney-client
privilege supports extending it to corporations when consulting with
their in-house counsel.13 Although South Carolina has not yet ruled on
this question directly, the state’s Supreme Court in Ross v. Medical
University of South Carolina presumed that corporations enjoy the
attorney-client privilege when communicating with their in-house
counsel.14 Given this law and the stated public policy favoring the
attorney-client privilege, South Carolina attorneys (whether outside
counsel or in-house) can operate safe in the knowledge that the legal
advice that they provide to their domestic clients will be protected.
C. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT EUROPEAN UNION PRIVILEGE LAW.
The legal professional privilege is roughly the European
continental equivalent of the attorney-client privilege of common law
jurisdictions.15 The scope and application of the legal professional
privilege varies significantly from country to country. 16 In Australian
Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commissioner, (A.M. & S.) the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that E.U. supra-national law did
11

Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112 (citing 81 AM. JUR. 2D
Witnesses § 221 (1980)).
12
Id. (quoting S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Booker, 260 S.C. 245, 254,
195 S.E.2d 615, 619-20 (1973); note that “Shall” is used in the original case,
but the court in State v. Love uses “should”).
13
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395, 101 S.Ct. 677, 685 (1981).
14
Ross v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 317 S.C. 377, 383, 453 S.E.2d 880, 884
(1994).
15
See EDWARD, supra note 8; see also Council of the Bars and Law
Societies of the European Union, supra note 8.
16
Id.
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recognize an evidentiary privilege. This professional legal privilege
protects communications between attorneys and corporations. 17 A.M.
& S. defined the privilege as protecting “the confidentiality of written
communications between lawyer and client” where two requirements
are met: first, “the communications are made [pursuant to] the client's
rights of defence [sic];” and second, the communications are with an
independent lawyer.18 Here, “independent” was defined to mean “not
bound to the client by a relationship of employment.”19
The rule in A.M. & S. implied that companies operating within the
E.U. do not retain the legal professional privilege with any person who
is not a member of an E.U. member state bar or their in-house counsel
in any area of E.U. regulation.20 However, A.M. & S. did not address
whether bar membership and contractual terms could put sufficient
distance between an in-house attorney and the corporation such that the
attorney was not “bound.” 21 Nearly thirty years later the ECJ answered
these questions when it promulgated what is now the leading decision
on legal professional privilege and in-house counsel: Akzo Nobel
Chemicals Ltd. v. European Commission. 22
Akzo affirmed the general view that in-house attorneys are
dependent employees within the E.U. legal structure rather than
independent attorneys.23 Furthermore, the highly influential advisory
opinion of the Advocate General in Akzo, the reasoning of which was
adopted by the ECJ opinion, expressly rejected extending legal
professional privilege to communications with practicing attorneys who
were not members of an E.U. member state bar.24 The decision does

17
Case 155/79 Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982
E.C.R. 1575, ¶ 21.
18
Id. The requirement of the relationship to the client’s “right of defense”
is beyond the scope of this note and was not at issue in Akzo Nobel. The “right
of defense” requirement functionally means that the legal professional privilege
will apply in contexts that are more narrow than those in which the attorneyprivilege will apply. This requirement might be compared to work “in
anticipation of litigation.” See generally EDWARD, supra note 8; see also
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, supra note 8.
19
Id.
20
See Id.
21
Id.
22
Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010).
23
Id.
24
Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott , Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems.
Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 62007CC0550, ¶¶ 188-90 (Apr. 29,
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not limit itself to competition regulation,25 and it carries at least some
weight as precedent for future cases.26 Additionally, subsequent noncompetition authority has relied upon Akzo. In European Renewable
Energies Federation ASBL v. European Commission, a procedural case
decided independent of competition law, the ECJ cited Akzo for its
conception of in-house attorneys as dependent employees.27
Furthermore, the statutory language interpreted in Akzo is not unique,
and expansive application of the principles of Akzo is very possible
where equivalent language appears in other statutes. 28 Also, given the
structure of European regulation schemes, Akzo’s principles could
easily be applied across the body of E.U. regulatory systems.29
D.

THE AKZO DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Taken together, ECJ jurisprudence holds that enterprises
operating within the E.U. certainly do not enjoy legal professional
privilege with their in-house counsel, at least in competition
investigations, and probably not in any other regulatory area either.
Additionally, enterprises may not enjoy legal professional privilege
with an outside attorney who is not a member of an E.U. member state
bar in the same areas.
1.

BACKGROUND TO AKZO: AUSTRALIAN MINING & SMELTING

The ECJ first considered the applicability of legal professional
privilege in European Commission (Commission) competition
investigations in A.M & S.30 The court in A.M. & S. considered a
demand in the course of a Commission competition investigation for
access to documents that Australian Mining & Smelting claimed were
protected by legal professional privilege. 31 The Commission conducted
the investigation under Article 14 of Council Regulation No. 17, which
as then written, empowered the Commission to conduct “such

2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:62007CC0550:EN:HTML (last visited May 1, 2012).
25
Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶¶ 40-51.
26
See discussion infra Part I.3.C.
27
Case C-74/10, European Renewable Energies Fed’n v. European
Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. 00000, ¶¶ 52-53.
28
Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶ 2. For similar language in other statutes, see
discussion infra Part I.4.
29
See discussion infra Part I.4.
30
Case 155/79 Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982
E.C.R. 1575.
31
Id. at ¶ 1.
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investigations ‘as are necessary.’”32 The Commission argued that its
broad investigative powers under Article 14 superseded any nationally
recognized legal professional privilege and entitled it to access the
contested documents.33 The ECJ rejected this argument, instead
recognizing that there was a principle common to all member states
protecting written communications pursuant to the right of defense
between clients and “independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who
are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment.” 34 After
the decision in A.M. & S., it became apparent that the ECJ
distinguished between in-house counsel and outside attorneys when
determining the applicability of the legal professional privilege.
2.

THE AKZO DECISION

Nearly thirty years after A.M. & S., the ECJ revisited the question
of legal professional privilege in competition investigations in Akzo.35
In Akzo, the court considered whether legal professional privilege
extended to, inter alia, emails between a general manager and an
attorney in the company’s legal department that were seized in the
course of a Commission competition investigation.36 The attorney was
enrolled as an Advocaat of the Netherlands bar, and Dutch national law
accorded the protection of its legal professional privilege to the
communications.37 Nonetheless, the Akzo court held that legal
professional privilege did not apply. 38 The ECJ affirmed that legal
professional privilege applied only to “independent” attorneys, and
reasoned that an attorney’s independence is determined both positively,
by bar membership and concomitant responsibilities and disciplinary

32
Id. at ¶ 15, (quoting Commission Regulation 204/62, 1959-1962 O.J.
SPEC. ED. 87.).
33
Id. at ¶ 10.
34
Id. at ¶ 21.
35
Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010).
36
Id. ¶¶ 3, 8.
37
Id. ¶¶ 8, 35-36; see JOHN FISH, REGULATED LEGAL PROFESSIONALS AND
PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC AREA AND SWITZERLAND, AND CERTAIN OTHER EUROPEAN
JURISDICTIONS 39-41 (2004), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/
user_upload/NTCdocument/fish_report_enpdf1_1184145269.pdf (review of
Dutch legal professional privilege between an in-house attorney and client
corporation).
38
Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶ 122.
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procedures; and negatively, by the absence of dependence upon the
client.39
Under this rationale, the Akzo court held that in-house counsel
could never be independent, even if they were admitted to a national
bar, because they are salaried by their client corporations and intimately
involved with their operations.40 While A.M. & S. had implied this
result,41 the Akzo court judicially confirmed the presumption.
Furthermore, although the Akzo court specifically interpreted E.U.
competition Article 14 of Council Regulation No. 17, 42 the ECJ did not
limit its decision to competition law only. 43
Additionally, the advisory opinion of the Advocate General in
Akzo suggests that legal professional privilege does not extend to
practicing outside attorneys who are not members of an E.U. member
state bar.44 The Advocate General is a legal professional tasked with
assessing the claims of the parties to a case before the ECJ,
investigating the applicable law, and issuing an advisory opinion to the
Court proposing a holding. 45 The Advocate General’s opinion is nonbinding but highly influential.46 In her opinion in Akzo, Advocate
General Kokott expressly rejected extending legal professional
privilege to communications with practicing attorneys who were not
members of an E.U. member state bar: 47
[W]ith third countries there is, generally speaking, no
adequate basis for the mutual recognition of legal
qualifications and professional ethical obligations to
39

Id. ¶¶ 42-45.
Id. ¶¶ 47-49.
41
Case 155/79 Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982
E.C.R. 1575.
42
Commission Regulation 204/62, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87, amended
by Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 14.
43
Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010).
44
Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott , Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems.
Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 62007CC0550, ¶¶ 188-90 (Apr. 29,
2010).
45
Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Union, art. 49, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 210.
46
Pinset Masons, Adidas Did Not Suffer Trade Mark Dilution, Says
Advocate General, OUT-LAW.COM (Jul. 16, 2003), http://www.outlaw.com/page-3731 (“The Advocate General's opinion is highly influential and
usually followed by the Court.”).
47
Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott, Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶¶ 189-90.
40

2012]

THE PRIVILEGE STOPS AT THE BORDER, EVEN IF
A COMMUNICATION KEEPS GOING

305

which lawyers are subject in the exercise of their
profession. In many cases, it would not even be
possible to ensure that the third country in question
has a sufficiently established rule-of-law tradition
which would enable lawyers to exercise their
profession in the independent manner required and
thus to perform their role as collaborators in the
administration of justice.48
While the Advocate General’s discussion focused on in-house
attorneys, her opinion did not restrict the reasoning only to employed
attorneys, and notes that legal professional privilege applies only where
attorneys operate “as collaborators in the administration of justice.” 49
The ECJ did not specifically address this point but did affirm Kokott’s
framing of the issues, her reasoning, and her results. 50 This implies, at
a minimum, there is some question as to whether legal professional
privilege would extend even to an outside attorney who is not a
member of an E.U. member state bar, especially where the attorney’s
bar conceives of the attorney’s role as more adversarial than that
described in Advocate General Kokott’s opinion in Akzo.51
Therefore, Akzo clearly allows the Commission in the course of a
competition investigation to access all correspondence or other
documents passing between an in-house attorney and the client
corporation that are not made by or to outside counsel pursuant to the
right of defense. Given that the opinion of AG Kokott expressly
rejected extending legal professional privilege to communications with
practicing attorneys who were not members of an E.U. member state
bar,52 the same might be true of communications passing between such
outside attorneys and the client corporation. This is true even if
identical correspondence with outside European counsel would be
covered by legal professional privilege. Furthermore, because there
48

Id. ¶ 190.
Id.
50
Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010).
51
See European Court of Justice Confirms That in-House Legal Advice Is
Not Protected By Legal Privilege, Corporate Legal Update, MAYER BROWN
(Sept. 2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/london/article.asp?id=9638&nid
=369 (concluding from this language that “it is clear that communications
between clients and external counsel who are members of a bar or law society
in a third country will, as is presently the case, not attract legal professional
privilege”).
52
Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶ 90.
49
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was no language in Akzo limiting the decision to competition
investigations, Akzo could be applied similarly in any other E.U.
regulatory case. Thus, companies subject to E.U. law probably do not
retain the legal professional privilege with their in-house counsel or
attorneys who are not members of E.U. member state bars in any
regulatory area.
3.

PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF ECJ DECISIONS: THERE’S ROOM FOR
DEBATE, BUT THE ECJ EXPECTS ATTORNEYS TO PAY ATTENTION

The ECJ decision in Akzo carries at least some precedential
weight for future jurisprudence.
ECJ decisions carry more precedential weight than decisions in
continental civil-law systems while perhaps not quite as much as
decisions in common-law systems.53 At a minimum, ECJ decisions
provide guidance as to the probable outcome of future cases.54 Also,
ECJ opinions cite to previous opinions of that court as support for its
reasoning and holdings,55 implying that the court sees its decisions as
having weight for its own jurisprudence beyond the case under
consideration.
Furthermore, the ECJ has indicated that it expects its decisions on
E.U. law to be binding upon future cases of E.U. law before national
courts.56 C.I.L.F.I.T. v Ministry of Health considered whether the
highest Italian court was required to submit a case to the European
courts in order to comply with Italy’s treaty obligations as a member of
the European Community.57 In C.I.L.F.I.T., the Italian court believed
that E.U. law clearly disposed of the issue, but one of the parties
attempted to raise a question of interpretation of the law.58 The ECJ
held that a national court is not required to submit a case based upon
E.U. law where the court “has established . . . that the [E.U.] provision
in question has already been interpreted by the Court of Justice.” 59
This suggests that the ECJ expects its decisions to have at least some
precedential bearing on future cases.
53
See Richard L. Merpi II, Note, The Lisbon Treaty and EU TreatyMaking Power: The Next Evolutionary Step and Its Effects on Member States
and Third-Party Nations, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 795, 800 n.42 (2010).
54
Id.
55
See Akzo, Case C-550/07 P.
56
C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3431-32
(authentic language Italian).
57
Id. at 3418-19.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 3431-32.
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SUBSEQUENT NON-COMPETITION AUTHORITY RELYING UPON AKZO:
BROAD APPLICATIONS MEAN BROAD IMPLICATIONS

The holding in Akzo cannot be restricted to competition law
alone, and even shortly after the decision the ECJ demonstrated that
broad application of Akzo’s principles is both possible and logical. The
ECJ extensively cited Akzo in European Renewable Energies
Federation ASBL v. European Commission (EREF) for its conception
of in-house attorneys as dependent employees. 60 Although the original
actions arose out of state aid decisions (arguably resembling a
competition case), EREF was a procedural case, and the opinion did not
address competition law.61 In EREF, the Federation brought two
actions to annul Commission decisions. The Federation held that
certain methods of national financing for the construction of nuclear
power plants constituted improper state aid.62 A lawyer who also
served as director of the Federation brought the applications for
annulment.63 The General Court, however, rejected the application
asserting that the lawyer was barred from representing EREF because
the Federation employed her.64 The General Court’s premise was
based on the procedural grounds; Article 19 of the Statute of the Court
of Justice of the E.U. requires that parties be “represented” by a lawyer
before European courts. 65 On appeal, the ECJ affirmed the lower
court’s holding that an attorney employed by a company could not
practice before the European courts, and relied upon A.M. & S. and
Akzo in its opinion dismissing the appeal:
[T]he requirement as to the position and status as an
independent lawyer is based on a conception of the
lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of
justice of the [E.U.]. . . . [Akzo held] that the
requirement of independence of a lawyer implies that
there must be no employment relationship between
the lawyer and his client.66
60

Case C-74/10, Eur’n Renewable Energies Fed’n v. Eur’n Comm’n,
2010 E.C.R. 00000, ¶¶ 52-53.
61
Id. ¶¶ 12-14, 16.
62
Id. ¶¶ 1, 6.
63
Id. ¶ 7.
64
Id. ¶¶ 12-18 (citing 2010 O.J. (C 83) 210 at 214).
65
Id.
66
Eur’n Renewable Energies Fed’n, Case C-74/10, ¶¶ 52-53 (citing Case
155/79, Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, ¶
24; Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 42 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010)).
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Additionally, the opinion never addressed any issues of corporate
personhood in connection with an attorney’s status as a director of the
enterprise, but instead focused on the attorney’s status as an
employee.67 Stated simply, in EREF, the ECJ reiterated its support for
the proposition that lawyers employed by corporations would not be
treated as independent attorneys before European courts. 68
Furthermore, EREF demonstrated that Akzo’s conception of inhouse attorneys as dependent employees rather than independent
attorneys is not confined to competition law, and presumably the same
would apply by analogy to attorneys who are not members of an E.U.
member state bar. This extension and reiteration of Akzo shows that the
decision could easily serve as authority for the Commission to ignore
an individual nation’s recognized legal professional privilege between
in-house counsel, foreign attorneys, and the client corporation in any
regulatory area.
F.

ROOM FOR FURTHER EXPANSION: SIMILAR STATUTES AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS PERMIT BROAD AKZO APPLICATION

Further expansion of Akzo is also possible because the statutory
clause interpreted in that case is not unique. The Commission could
push to grant itself similar powers in any regulatory area. Akzo
interpreted Article 14 of Council Regulation No. 17, which reads in
relevant part: “In carrying out the duties assigned to it . . . , the
Commission may undertake all necessary investigations into
undertakings [i.e. businesses] and associations of undertakings.” 69
Akzo clarified that this E.U.-level statutory grant of power to the
Commission superseded nationally recognized legal professional
privilege between attorneys and a client corporation where the
attorneys were not outside counsel who were members of an E.U.
member state bar.70 A simple search of E.U. legislation on Eur-Lex for
the term “all necessary investigations” reveals that E.U. law grants
power to the Commission or national bodies to perform “all necessary
investigations” in a mergers and acquisitions directive, 71 “Ecolabel”

67

Id. ¶¶ 49-51.
Id. ¶¶ 52-53 (citing Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur., Case 155/79, ¶ 24;
Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶ 42).
69
Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 2 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010), interpreting 1962 O.J. (13)
204, amended by 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 at 14.
70
Id. ¶ 114-15.
71
2011 O.J. (L 110) 1 art. 10 ¶ 3.
68
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environmental product labeling regulation, 72 air traffic control
regulation,73 and a veterinary check on imported products directive. 74
Additionally, other regulations that may not so directly empower the
Commission still may be written in ways that permit overriding public
interests to supersede confidentiality considerations.75
In light of these legislative grants, it appears that Akzo could be
applied as authority for the proposition that the power to conduct “all
necessary investigations” trumps nationally recognized legal
professional privilege between a corporation and an in-house attorney
under any of these legislative acts. While this note does not undertake
a study of E.U. governmental institutions, expansion through similar
grants of language seems especially possible given that the European
Commission is the primary governmental organ charged with writing,
proposing, interpreting, and enforcing E.U.-level legislation.76 Thus,
further extension of Akzo also is possible through interpretation of
existing legislation.
Another possible area of application of Akzo’s principles in E.U.
law might be corporate governance regulation. Under Directive
2006/46/EC (Directive), the E.U. directed its member states to
accomplish several corporate governance goals. 77 As explained by the
“Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate
Governance in the Member States” (Study),
[n]ational corporate governance codes lay down rules
or recommendations that are not mandatory, but with
which companies must either comply, or explain
deviations . . . . [The Directive] mandates the
application of corporate governance codes by way of
comply-or-explain – or alternatively allows the

72

2010 O.J. (L 27) 1 art. 10 ¶ 3.
2008 O.J. (L 79) 1 art. 55 ¶ 1.
74
1998 O.J. (L 24) 9 art. 24 ¶ 1.
75
Cf. Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott, Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v.
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, CELEX 62009C0524, ¶ 98 (Oct. 14, 2010)
(Comparing two potentially conflicting Directives: “the confidentiality of
commercial information . . . may be outweighed only by overriding interests
deserving protection.”).
76
See European Commission, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu
/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm (last visited May 1,
2012).
77
2006 O.J. (L 224) 1.
73
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The Study indicated that internal control and risk management
measures are generally regulated by national codes, which it
characterized as being “regularly updated” and “flexible but also living
instruments, which adapt to changing legal, economic, and social
realities.”79 This malleable framework allows member states the
flexibility to permit sweeping investigative powers while aligning with
general Directive principles. While it is unclear whether courts would
treat such a national regulation written pursuant to an E.U.-level
Directive in the same manner as a Commission regulation, in theory
such a scheme could open the door for regulatory authorities to apply
Akzo as supra-national authority80 in seeking materials that otherwise
would be protected by the legal professional privilege. Indeed, the ECJ
most likely will consider this question eventually as E.U.-wide
legislation and ECJ opinions become an increasingly significant part of
the E.U. project as a whole, which is characterized as a “work in
progress,”81 with the courts having a reputation as being a driving force
for unification.82 Accordingly, corporate governance regulation is
another potential area of Akzo application.
In summary, it should be clear that supra-national E.U. law does
not attach evidentiary privileges to some communications that an
American practitioner would expect to be covered by the attorneyclient privilege. Also, questions remain as to whether the privilege
attaches to any communications from attorneys licensed outside of the
78

RISK METRICS GROUP ET AL., STUDY ON MONITORING AND
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE MEMBER STATES
11 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/
ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf (comparing how member
states implemented the Directive).
79
Id.
80
Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd v. Comm’n, EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 119 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010) (supremacy of EU
supranational directives over conflicting national legal rules).
81
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR PRESS AND
COMMUNICATION, KEY FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_glance/44/en1.pdf.
82
Stephanie Bier, The European Court of Justice and Member State
Relations: A Constructivist Analysis of the European Legal Order (May 2008)
(unpublished paper) (presented at First Annual Graduate Student Conference
on
International
Relations,
May
14,
2008),
available
at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irconf/papers/bier.pdf.
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E.U. Additionally, as the law in this area evolves, it remains to be seen
just how broadly the reasoning of Akzo will be applied both at the
national and the supra-national level. This evolution could have a
particular significance for attorneys who practice internationally while
licensed in states that do not view attorneys primarily as “collaborators
in the administration of justice.”83

II.
A.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR A SOUTH CAROLINA
PRACTITIONER: FOREWARNED IS FOREARMED
SUMMARY OF PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR A SOUTH CAROLINA
PRACTITIONER

In light of the disparate treatment by E.U. privilege law of
communications from lawyers who are and are not members of E.U.
member state bars, and any in-house attorney, it should be clear that
domestic practitioners must exercise a great deal of caution when
working with international clients with exposure to E.U. jurisdiction.
Domestic attorneys must be aware that the attorney-client privilege
may not attach to communications that are accessible to the European
Commission in an investigation. South Carolina attorneys must be
aware that, because South Carolina courts have not addressed this
conflict of laws question directly, the attorney-client privilege may be
susceptible to attack even in a court of this state under certain
conditions.
B.

WHAT KIND OF COMMUNICATION MIGHT BE INVOLVED?

Given that South Carolina law and stated public policy uphold the
attorney-client privilege,84 South Carolina in-house attorneys can
operate safe in the knowledge that the legal advice that they provide to
their employing corporations operating only in the U.S. will be
protected by the privilege. However, what about advice to corporations
that are not purely domestic?
Returning to the example given at the beginning of this note,
suppose that a corporate entity operating in both South Carolina and
Germany employs an attorney at the company’s South Carolina
headquarters. The general counsel based in Munich, Germany, e-mails
the South Carolina in-house attorney and seeks a legal opinion as a
83

Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott , Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems.
Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 62007CC0550, ¶ 190 (Apr. 29,
2010).
84
Love, 275 S.C. 55, 271 S.E.2d 110.
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component of the development of a comprehensive strategy to increase
global market share. (Compare this scenario to the situations in A.M. &
S. and Akzo, where in each case major enterprises were the subject of
anti-trust investigations by the European Commission.) 85 The South
Carolina attorney replies in an email that contains the legal opinion and
never questions whether the attorney-client privilege attached to the
communication. A copy of the email is stored on the client’s server in
Munich and on the corporate counsel’s computer.
C.

CROSS-BORDER COMMUNICATION UNDER E.U.-LEVEL LEGAL
PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE LAW

Under Akzo, there is no question that if the European Commission
opened a competition investigation, and probably any other
investigation, into the activities of the corporate client the Commission
could rightfully demand a copy of the email.86 The Commission might
even seize the general counsel’s computer or the entire server in a dawn
raid, similar to the raid where the Commission seized the
communications at issue in Akzo.87
D.

SOUTH CAROLINA COURTS AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE

How a South Carolina court would assess a challenged assertion
of attorney-client privilege over a cross-border communication with a
European client is an open question. At least, a court of this state
probably would find that a communication seized in the course of a
Commission investigation ceased to be confidential, and therefore the
attorney-client privilege no longer applied.88 Additionally, a litigant
could challenge an assertion of privilege on the theory that E.U.
privilege law controls the treatment of the communication.89 Although
presence in a South Carolina forum probably would dictate that South
Carolina evidentiary rules applied, this scenario presents a conflict of
laws question90 that our courts have not yet answered. Finally, a
litigant could assert that the confidentiality requirement of the privilege
85

See generally Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd v. Comm’n,
EUR-Lex CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 119 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010); see also Case
155/79, Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575.
86
Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶¶ 120-22.
87
Id. ¶ 3.2.
88
81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 362 (2011) (“the privilege evaporates the
moment that confidentiality ceases to exist.”).
89
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (2011).
90
See infra Part II.4-B (comparing the approaches of RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (2011) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (2011)).
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was not met, and therefore the attorney-client privilege never
attached.91 None of these theories would necessarily succeed, but each
of them could be asserted credibly.
1.

DESTRUCTION OF THE PRIVILEGE BY DISCLOSURE TO THE
COMMISSION

First, a South Carolina court reasonably could find that a
communication seized in the course of a Commission investigation
ceased to be confidential, and, therefore, that the attorney-client
privilege no longer applied. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in
State v. Love, cited American Jurisprudence (Second) for its rule
statement that in order for the privilege to exist, “it must be shown that
the relationship between the parties was that of attorney and client and
that the communications were of a confidential nature.”92 American
Jurisprudence 2d also states that, “the privilege evaporates the moment
that confidentiality ceases to exist.” 93 A communication intentionally
disclosed to the European Commission, even under legal compulsion,
can no longer be considered confidential. Therefore, it follows that the
attorney-client privilege evaporates at the time of the disclosure to the
Commission.94 Although a South Carolina court might seek a different
result on other grounds, perhaps as a matter of public policy, 95 such a
court could reasonably find that the attorney-client privilege no longer
applied under these standards.
2.

CHALLENGING PRIVILEGE BASED ON E.U. LAW

Second, even if a cross-border communication has not been
disclosed to the European Commission, the privileged nature of a
communication still might reasonably be challenged under the theory
that the law controlling any privilege over the communication is E.U.level evidentiary privilege law and not the law of the local forum. This
challenge would present a novel conflict of laws question for this state.
However, South Carolina would probably adopt the approach dictating
91

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71
(2011) (describing confidentiality requirement as a prerequisite to attachment
of the attorney-client privilege).
92
Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112 (citing 81 AM. JUR. 2D
Witnesses § 221 (1980)).
93
81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 362 (2011).
94
Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71
(2011) (describing confidentiality requirement as a prerequisite to attachment
of the attorney-client privilege).
95
Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112. (quoting S.C. State Highway
Dep’t v. Booker, 260 S.C. 245, 254, 195 S.E.2d 615, 619-20 (1973)).
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that South Carolina law would control; but even if it did not, it still
could uphold the privilege on policy grounds. Thus, E.U.-level
evidentiary privilege law probably could not directly control the
determination of the attachment of the attorney-client privilege in a
South Carolina court.
Where a party challenges the admissibility of evidence based on
the laws of another forum, the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws 96
and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 97 set out two
different approaches to this question that result in two different
outcomes. The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws takes a strict
territoriality approach to the question of the admissibility of evidence,
stating simply that “[t]he law of the forum determines the admissibility
of a particular piece of evidence.”98 Nationally, this is now the
minority view among states that either have considered the question or
have signaled how they might approach the question. 99 Under the
Restatement (First) approach, the attorney-client privilege is treated as
procedural law. As such, a forum always applies its own local law.
Under this approach, the law of the state court would control a
challenge to the attorney-client privilege, rather than the legal
professional privilege law of the E.U.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws adopts the “most
significant relationship test,”100 which is the majority rule now among
states, and classifies the attorney-client privilege as a substantive
question.101 The Restatement (Second) pronounces:
Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of
the state which has the most significant relationship
with the communication will be admitted, even
though it would be privileged under the local law of
the forum, unless the admission of such evidence
would be contrary to the strong public policy of the
forum.102

96

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (2011).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (2011).
98
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (2011).
99
E. Todd Presnell & James A. Beakes, The Application of Conflict of
Laws to Evidentiary Privileges, in EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES FOR CORPORATE
COUNSEL 157, 162-67 (DRI, 2008), available at http://www.mondaq.in/
unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=66318.
100
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971).
101
Presnell & Beakes, supra note 99.
102
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971).
97
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Under the Restatement (Second) approach, if an E.U. member-state had
the “most significant relationship” with the communication, both the
national law of the member state and E.U. legal professional privilege
law logically would apply.
A hypothetical illustration may help clarify the two alternative
approaches. Suppose that a litigant in South Carolina sought to
discover and admit into evidence an email sent from the general
counsel of Acme, S.A. to the president of the company. Both the
general counsel and the president work in Paris, France. The email was
sent and received under circumstances that would normally satisfy
South Carolina standards for the attorney-client privilege to attach, but
would not satisfy French and E.U. standards for the legal professional
privilege to attach. The email was “carbon copied” to the general
counsel of a branch office in South Carolina, and the local attorney
responded to the discovery request by asserting that the communication
was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Under the Restatement
(First), a South Carolina court would apply the procedural law of the
forum, which would mandate that the attorney-client privilege applied
to the communication.103 Conversely, French and the E.U. privilege
law would apply, under the Restatement (Second) approach, because
France and the E.U. would have the “most significant relationship” to
the communication.104 Under this analysis, the email would not be
privileged unless its admission was contrary to a strong public policy of
South Carolina.105
South Carolina has not decided which of the two conflicting
approaches it would apply, and other states have decided the
fundamental question in two different ways. 106 The Fourth Circuit in
Rawls Auto Auction Sales v. Dick Herriman Ford Inc. predicted that
South Carolina would likely follow the Restatement (First) approach of
territoriality.107 This prediction was confirmed by the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s opinion in Lister v. NationsBank where the Court
stated, “South Carolina has not adopted the modern choice of law test
found in the Restatement [Second].”108 Nonetheless, the Court
immediately proceeded to “hold that if the Restatement [Second] test
were applied . . . South Carolina is the place with the ‘most significant
103

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (2011).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971).
105
Id.
106
Presnell & Beakes, supra note 99.
107
Rawls Auto Auction Sales v. Dick Herriman Ford Inc., 690 F.2d 422,
427 (4th Cir. 1982).
108
Lister v. NationsBank, 329 S.C. 133, 145, 494 S.E.2d 449, 456 (1997).
104
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relationship’ . . . .”109 The Lister Court then engaged in a lengthy
discussion applying the Restatement (Second) approach to the facts of
the case.110 This appears to leave the door open to the application of the
Restatement (Second) in South Carolina. Furthermore, the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate that foreign law will
control the substantive rulings of some proceedings, and the Rules give
state courts the authority to determine and apply that law as required.111
Although South Carolina is a Restatement (First) state, the
Supreme Court left the door open to the application of the Restatement
(Second) in future cases. But three factors point toward a South
Carolina court upholding the attorney-client privilege in the face of a
challenge based on E.U. legal professional privilege law. First, the
Fourth Circuit prediction that South Carolina likely would follow the
Restatement (First) approach is probably correct. Second, even if
South Carolina did elect to adopt the Restatement (Second) approach in
a situation where a litigant challenged the privileged nature of a
communication under the substantial relation test, admission of the
communication would still “be contrary to the strong public policy of
the forum.”112 South Carolina rules do contemplate that foreign law
will control a state court’s decision in at least some cases, 113 so it would
be reasonable and proper for a South Carolina court to apply
supranational E.U. law if it believed the situation so required. Also,
national law of the E.U. member state may not recognize any privilege
over the communication,114 meaning that the privilege could similarly
be challenged on the basis of national law independent of E.U.-level
privilege law. But the stated policy of South Carolina favoring the
attorney-client privilege nevertheless should trump application of a
foreign law that does not recognize the privilege. 115
Third, a party seeking disclosure of the privileged information
would argue that the power of the Commission to legally demand
production of the emailed communication in any investigation defeats
reasonable expectation of privacy.116 However, it would be difficult for
109

Id.
Id. at 146-48, 494 S.E.2d at 456-57.
111
S.C. R. CIV. P. 44(d).
112
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (2011).
113
S.C. R. CIV. P. 44(d).
114
See generally EDWARD, supra note 8; see also Council of the Bars and
Law Societies of the European Union, supra note 8.
115
Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112.
116
Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd v. Comm’n, EUR-Lex
CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 119 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010).
110
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the typical non-governmental litigant, not having been given such
authority, to challenge an assertion of attorney-client privilege in a
South Carolina court on this theory alone.
3. CHALLENGING PRIVILEGE BASED ON SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
A third, and possibly more successful, challenge to attaching the
attorney-client privilege to a cross-border communication with a client
is that the “confidentiality” requirement of the attorney-client privilege
in South Carolina could be defeated by the knowledge that the
communication cannot be expected to remain confidential.
As stated in State v. Love, the attorney-client privilege attaches
only to communications “of a confidential nature.”117 Since
confidentiality is a basic prerequisite under South Carolina law for the
privilege to attach, a showing that the cross-border communication
could never be confidential in a European Commission investigation
might render it admissible. The Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 71 supports this reasoning where it explains that
confidentiality requires a reasonable belief “that no one will learn the
contents of the communication except a privileged person . . . or
another person with whom communications are protected under a
similar privilege.”118 Akzo confirmed that the European Commission
has ready access on demand to communications to companies from
their in-house attorneys; therefore, no such attorney can reasonably
believe that their communications to these companies actually will be
confidential as contemplated by the Restatement. Under this approach,
the privilege never attached to the communication in the first place, and
therefore the communication is not protected.
Of course, both the attorney and the corporate client in the
example above intended the cross-border communication to be secret
and confidential. The key to the success of this theory would be to
convince a state court to distinguish between the desire that the
information remain undiscovered and the reasonable expectation that
the information remain undiscovered. Under the Restatement, a litigant
would have a strong argument that the communication between the
hypothetical lawyer and the client could not properly be considered
confidential, because it could never be withheld from the European
Commission in the course of an investigation. Given that this theory
relies primarily upon South Carolina law for the substantive privilege
117
Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112 (citing 81 AM. JUR. 2d
Witnesses § 221 (1980)).
118
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 (2011).
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rules and upon E.U.-level legal professional privilege law only for
circumstantial facts and reasonable expectations, this theory has a
serious chance of success in a South Carolina court.
But even given this chance of success, a South Carolina court
probably still would find that the privilege applies to the
communication. First, the average litigant in a South Carolina court
does not have the broad power of seizure that the Commission has.
Therefore, even if the Commission could seize the communication, this
does not necessarily mean that anyone else could access the
communication. Second, a South Carolina court probably would find
that where the communications had not yet been seized, those
documents had not yet been exposed to the public. Therefore, the
confidentiality had not been destroyed. Finally, even where the
documents had been seized, a South Carolina court could uphold the
privilege based on the reasonable expectation that the communications
would remain private at least in South Carolina fora.
4.

RESORT TO TREATIES: DEFERENCE TO LOCAL RULES

Treaties tend to preserve, rather than resolve, the conflicts
inherent in the treatment of evidence in international law by deferring
to local law. The most significant treaty on international evidence rules,
the Hague Convention, focuses on the acquisition of evidence across
international borders.119 The Convention remains silent on the
treatment of evidence and the preservation of any privileges once that
evidence is in international legal fora.120 Insofar as the Convention does
address evidentiary privileges, it is only to require that international
requests for evidence be executed in compliance with local rules. 121
Practically speaking, this means that the attorney-client privilege would
be protected in international discovery requests. All other conflicts of
law issues are left to local fora.
E.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING: WHAT THIS
MEANS FOR SOUTH CAROLINA ATTORNEYS WITH INTERNATIONAL
EXPOSURE

In light of Akzo and its implications, in-house attorneys that
advise corporate clients with E.U. exposure must exercise a heightened
level of caution in terms of confidentiality. Also, these practitioners
119
Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters art. 9, opened for signature Mar. 18,1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
847 U.N.T.S. 231.
120
Id.
121
Id.
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must be prepared to defend the attorney-client privilege in a court of
this state based not just on the black-letter requirements of attachment,
but also based upon the public policy of this state favoring the
privilege.122
First, practitioners should not assume that evidentiary privileges
would attach to their communications to and from clients in E.U.
member states, even if an identical communication with a domestic
client would be privileged. Domestic practitioners in situations where
such communication is required may wish to coordinate with and
communicate through local outside counsel licensed to practice law in a
E.U. member state. While this is often an expensive and cumbersome
process for both the client and the domestic attorney, it appears to be
the only safe way to ensure that cross-border communication will be
truly privileged.
Once more, a hypothetical illustration may help clarify by
returning to the example of a corporate client, operating in both South
Carolina and at least one E.U. member state, which employs an
attorney at the company’s South Carolina headquarters. The general
counsel based in Munich, Germany, emails the South Carolina in-house
attorney and seeks a legal opinion as a component of the development
of a comprehensive strategy to increase global market share. Under
these circumstances, the wisest course of action would be to retain
outside counsel who is licensed to practice law in a jurisdiction of the
E.U.123 If this is not a viable option, the next best course of action is to
have a phone conversation to relay the answer, rather than transmitting
a written document into a jurisdiction where it will not be privileged
from seizure and use in an investigation.
Next, practitioners must be prepared to defend the attorney-client
privilege in a court of this state based on the public policy of this state
favoring the privilege.124 Because civil law systems do not engage in
the type and degree of discovery practice of common-law systems, it is
unlikely that a South Carolina attorney will be faced with a discovery
122

Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112.
Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott, Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems.
Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 62007CC0550 (Apr. 29, 2010)
(rejecting the argument that the legal professional privilege should extend to
communications with attorneys not licensed to practice in an EU member
state); see also Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd v. Comm’n, EURLex CELEX 62007J0550, ¶¶ 45, 57, 119 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010) (affirming the
opinion of AG Kokott in framing and interpreting the issues generally, though
not on this specific point, in references throughout the opinion).
124
Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112.
123
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request from a party in the E.U. But a creative and well-informed party
seeking discovery in this state, or operating in a South Carolina court,
could reasonably attack the privilege on the theory that the privilege
over certain documents had been destroyed when the European
Commission seized them;125 that foreign and not domestic privilege
laws controlled any privilege determination; 126 or that the privilege
never attached to the documents because of the possibility of
disclosure.127 Of course, the black-letter law arguments in each case
would vary based upon the facts and circumstances of each
determination. But in each case, it would be important to note to the
court the strong policy in this state in favor of the privilege; 128
especially in those cases where the court would be called upon to elect
between multiple frameworks for analyzing an assertion of privilege.
In sum, the most important thing is for domestic practitioners
with European clients to be aware of their limitations so that they can
proceed with a heightened sense of caution and awareness in order to
avoid disclosure of communications that were intended to be
confidential, and to defend the privilege from attack based on policy
grounds when faced with a potential conflict of black-letter rules.

III. CONCLUSION
Returning to the hypothetical South Carolina attorney described
earlier, she must be aware that European supra-national law does not
mirror South Carolina’s attorney-client privilege, and may not extend
evidentiary privileges to communications between the attorney and the
client in Europe. The holding, in Akzo, presents significant challenges
for domestic in-house attorneys. Furthermore, the language of AG
Kokott’s opinion implying that any communications from persons who
are not members of E.U.-member state bars to a corporation would not
be protected should concern even outside counsel advising international
clients. These challenges have the potential to blindside attorneys who
assume that similar evidentiary privileges will always attach to their
communications, no matter where they go. Of course, once the
limitations imposed by E.U. legal professional privilege law are made
clear, the attorney may advise the client of the potential pitfalls, bring
in outside counsel where required, and generally act with discretion to
125

See supra Part II.4-A.
See supra Part II.4-B.
127
See supra Part II.4-C.
128
Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112.
126
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ensure that communications remain as confidential as they were
intended to be.

